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Abstract
Security is one of the most important non-functional requirement of an application.
Computers surround us everywhere, and our life depends on them in many ways. Most
of these devices contain potential vulnerabilities as a result of poor programming. Taint
analysis is a technique which can catch potential security leaks with static code analysis.
It checks uses of data from external which data may have any value in a specific domain.
However, a lot of function expect values from the subset of the domain then, so they
expects sanitized data. The Clang Static Analyzer has a checker which can perform taint
analysis on C or C++ code. Our goal is to refine the checker’s architecture and increase
its efficiency. In order to achieve this, we need to make the checker configurable. Hence,
the user can set his own taint sources, propagation rules, sanitizers, and sinks. In addition,
we added an aggressive propagation mode to the checker, where all unknown functions
behave as a taint propagator. This greatly increases the checker’s hit rate, while it only
increases the false positives rate by a little. Another key point to remember is that we
added support for some C++ language features and built-in types.
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Absztrakt
A biztonság az egyik legfontosabb nem funkcionális követelmény egy alkalmazás
számára. Az életünk sok szempontból függ a minket körülvevő számítógépektől. A
legtöbb eszköz potenciális biztonsági réseket tartalmaz a nem megfelelő programozás
miatt. A taint analízis egy olyan technika, ami statikus kódanalízis használatával képes
felismerni potenciális biztonsági hibákat. Az analízis feladata olyan – külső forrásból
származó – adatok ellenőrzése, amelyek bármilyen értéket felvehetnek egy bizonyos
doménből, azonban sok függvény ennek a doménnek csak egy részéből várja az ada-
tokat. A Clang Static Analyzer tartalmaz egy checker-t, amely taint analízist tud végre-
hajtani C vagy C++ kódon. A célunk, hogy javítsuk a checker belső architektúráját és
növeljük annak hatékonyságát. Ennek elérése érdekében konfigurálhatóvá kell tennünk a
checker-t, így a felhasználó be tudja állítani a saját taint forrásait, terjesztőit, tisztítóit és
nyelőit. Ezen kívül hozzáadtunk egy agresszív taint terjesztési lehetőséget, ahol az összes
ismeretlen függvény taint terjesztőként viselkedik. Ez nagymértékben növeli a checker





The CodeChecker is an open source tool which can identify potentially wrong code
constructions at an early stage of the development with static code analysis. It increases
the software development speed, therefore, it makes the software cheaper and produces
better quality code. The CodeChecker is built on the Clang Static Analyzer (Clang SA)
which is one of the most advanced static analyzers. It can detect potential bugs in C and
C++ source code using symbolic execution. The Clang SA evolves with the support of
Apple, Google, Sony, and Ericsson.[1]
My thesis’s purpose is to compare various CERT(Computer Emergency Response
Team) organization’s suggestions with the static analyzer’s ability and to determine which
inspections are algorithmic and automated with high reliability.
The security-related issues could have a much bigger impact than other bugs. Usually,
a bug can cause bad behavior or crash, but for security issues the best case is when the
system crashes. Otherwise, a hacker can steal passwords or other sensitive data, and run
malicious code on our system or on our client’s system. There are many known attacks
for instance XSS, SQL injection, and buffer overflow.[2]
The thesis’s main direction is to check the inadequate uses of user inputs. When the
program reads some data from an untrustworthy source (standard input, file, or socket) it
will be tainted. Those data could be literally anything. A division should not be evaluated
with an unknown integer, because it could be zero which causes undefined behavior in
C++. An array should not index with a tainted value either. In modern systems, the 32
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bit signed integer’s maximum value is 2147483647 which is almost always bigger than
an array’s size. There are a number of problems with strings from an external source. Its
size and content are not known. The not sanitized string could cause several problems,
because the user can run his own commands in our system.
1.2 Results
To deal with this issue, I described an internal representation for a checker working
on taint analysis, which contains source, propagator, sanitizer and sink functions in a
configurable way. Moreover, I outlined how to handle C++ language features, for instance,
reference, extraction operator, assignment operator, namespaces, and member functions.
To support input I modeled built-in classes such as std::string, and std::istream.
I implemented this as the part of the Clang Static Analyzer - an open source code
analysis tool built on LLVM - which already has an existing implementation. I refined the
internal architecture, implemented configuration, and added support for C++.
I tested my implementation with CodeChecker - an open source static analysis in-
frastructure built on LLVM/Clang Static Analyzer toolchain - which can help store and
view defects. I performed analysis on several projects and I found four defects with taint
analysis in curl.[3] One of them was a false positive, and three of them was true positive.
Unfortunately, these defects are in the test code, but the results were important despite
this because these defects cannot be found by the original implementation. I summarize
one of the defects:
1 char* ptr;
2 FILE *stream;
3 stream = fopen(filename, "rb"); // stream is marked as tainted
4 char *cmd = NULL;
5 int error = getpart(&cmd, &cmdsize, "reply", "servercmd", stream); //
cmd and cmdsize are marked as tainted
Source code 1.1: Defect’s summary 1
7
1. Introduction
The first tainted symbol is the stream pointer, because fopen is a taint source. Next,
the analyzer parse the getpart function. Its definition is unknown, however, the checker
considers it as a taint propagator, which is one of the new features. Consequently, the
previous version lost the taint here. The checker’s assumption is correct, the function
reads data from the stream and writes it to the cmd buffer.
1 int rtp_size = 0;
2 ptr = cmd; // ptr is tainted
3 if (3 == sscanf(ptr, "rtp: part %d channel %d size %d",
4 &rtp_partno, &rtp_channel, &rtp_size)) {
5 rtp_scratch = malloc(rtp_size + 4 + RTP_DATA_SIZE); // Untrusted data
is used to specify the buffer size
6 }
Source code 1.2: Defect’s summary 2
The sscanf is an unknown function, and it is not in the checker’s built-in propagation
rules list, but it is correct to mark rtp_size as tainted. In conclusion, the allocated amounts
of memory depends on the file’s content without any sanitization.
Nonetheless, it is not perfect, since the aggressive propagation increases the rate of
false positives. Furthermore, C++ support is not complete, but it may offer a good start




2.1 Static code analysis
Static program analysis is performed without executing the program, but analyzing the
source code. Programmers make mistakes all the time, however, most of them are caught
by the compiler. The longer a bug lies in the code, the more expensive it can be to fix, and
more likely to cause financial or data loss. It is very important to find bugs at the earliest
phase of software development. There are many common coding problems, which can be
identified by a static analyzer tool. On the other hand, it is not as good as a manual review,
but it is much cheaper and faster. It can improve the review procedure very well.
Static analysis cannot find all bugs in the code. It looks for a fixed set of patterns, or
rules. Static analyzers will not fix the problem, they just emit some suspicious pattern.
They are not perfect. Moreover, it is programmers’ responsibility to decide whether it
found a real bug or just a false positive (the tool reports bugs that do not exist). It is aimed
to preserve the balance between false negatives (the program contains bugs that the tool do
not report) and false positives because programmers will stop using the tool if it generates
too many false positives.[4]
There are many security-related checks already implemented in the static analyzer
tools, which are essential for safety critical application. For instance, Clang-Tidy con-
tains several CERT checks, in particular, cert-msc51-cpp that was implemented by me. It
ensures that the user seeds his random generator properly.
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1 int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
2 std::mt19937 engine1; // Diagnose, always generate the same sequence
3 std::mt19937 engine2(1); // Diagnose
4 engine1.seed(); // Diagnose
5 engine2.seed(1); // Diagnose
6
7 std::time_t t;
8 engine1.seed(std::time(&t)); // Diagnose, system time might be
controlled by user
9
10 int x = atoi(argv[1]);
11 std::mt19937 engine3(x); // Will not warn
12 }
Source code 2.1: Properly seeded random generators
2.1.1 Taint analysis
External sources (from the user, socket, shared memory, command line) return values
where we cannot assume any limitation of the given values. That value is called tainted
and its origin a tainted source. Certain functions have preconditions for their actual pa-
rameters. Violations of those preconditions can cause undefined behavior or crash.
Functions and operations that have preconditions for their actual parameters are called
sinks. The standard library and the C/C++ language contain many sinks, for instance,
subscript operator or modulo operator. Moreover, there are many functions which expect
a null-terminated string. However, in many cases, the string’s content is important too.
For instance SQL injection, system calls or XSS are the most common cases.
Furthermore, tainted values are propagated through either functions or operations.
Most of the arithmetic operations propagate taintedness. On the other hand, functions
do not always behave as propagators. With this in mind, if the function’s behavior is
unknown, the propagation cannot be modeled precisely.
In order to make the taint analysis usable, there must be a way to remove the taint from
a value. Functions which ensure the value meets the preconditions are called sanitizers.
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They can sanitize the value in several ways, for instance, change the value, or terminate
the program.[5]
2.2 Existing implementations
2.2.1 Clang Static Analyzer
The Clang Static Analyzer (Clang SA) is built on the LLVM infrastructure and is part
of the Clang C/C++ compiler. The analyzer’s core performs symbolic executions of the
given program. It represents unknown input values as symbolic values and deduces all
expressions in the program. The execution is path sensitive, hence, every possible path
will be explored.[6, 7]
The Clang SA has a checker which is responsible for the taint analysis
(GenericTaintChecker). Currently, it supports only C functions, but it works on C++ code
as well. It has some common predefined taint sources, for instance, scanf, socket, getch,
and fopen. It implements taint propagation in two ways. Firstly taint can be propagated
through an expression. If a value is tainted in the expression, then the whole expression
will become tainted. Secondly, the checker contains many common predefined functions
which propagate taintedness through their parameters and return value. The checker also
contains predetermined sinks:
• Uncontrolled format string: untrusted data is used as a format string (CWE-134)[8]
• Tainted buffer size: untrusted data is used to specify the buffer size (CERT/STR31-
C)[9]
• System call: untrusted data is passed to a system call (CERT/STR02-C)[10]
• Array out of bound: untrusted data is used to index an array
• VLA size checker: has tainted size
• Division by zero: division by a tainted value, possibly zero
Despite this, it has many limitations. The user is unable to configure and add their own
known taint sources or propagators. Furthermore, there are no sanitizer functions, because
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there is no way to define that. Additionally, today the applications are developed in C++
rather than C. This deficiency significantly reduces its usability.
2.2.2 Custom Taint Checker
CustomTaintChecker is a Clang Static Analyzer plugin, which can be loaded into the
analyzer. The project had been forked from the GenericTaintChecker, unfortunately it
was not committed into the Clang SA. Not only it has all the features that the original
has, but also it is configurable and can handle sanitizer functions. However, it has limited
support for C++, for instance the configuration does not handle namespaces or member
functions. What’s more, it can not work with common C++ I/O functions, for instance,
std::cin.[11, 12]
2.2.3 Facebook Infer
Infer is an open source static analysis tool developed by Facebook. It has an experi-
mental checker named Quandary, which performs static taint analysis. It has a small list
of built-in sources and sinks, and can be used for Java. Sources, sinks, and sanitizers are
configurable by the user. In comparison to the Clang SA based checkers, it does not have
an ability to propagate taints through functions. In addition, the lack of built-in C/C++
sources and sinks makes it difficult to use on existing projects.[13]
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Outline of the solution
3.1 Internal working of the checker
In order to implement taint detection successfully, the limitations of the framework
must be known. Clang Static Analyzer works on a compiling unit. Firstly, the analyzer
core creates a call graph, then it starts the analysis at the top of it. Secondly, the checker
is called, when the analyzer hits a function call. If the function’s name matches with the
predefined list, then it will mark the return value or the output parameter(s) as tainted.
The analyzer framework can track back the operations performed on a specific vari-
able. To give an illustration, it can tell us when that variable was created by multiplying
another variable with an integral constant. Therefore, the tainted flag can be tracked down.
In conclusion, when a value is created by simple operations, the taint can be propagated
through them.
1 void foo(int n) {
2 int x;
3 scanf("%d", &x); // x is tainted
4 int y = x + 5; // y consist of a binary operation between x and a
constans
5 int z = y * n; // z consist of a binary operation between y and n
6 // z is tainted, if any of its ascendants are tainted
7 // x can be tracked back from z
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8 }
Source code 3.1: Taint propagation with symbols
Although it works only with operators, functions could be called with taint values. If
the function is defined in the same compilation unit, then it will be inlined. Accordingly,








7 void foo(int n) {
8 int x;
9 bar(&x); // x is tainted, because the analyzer know bar’s definition
10 func(&x); // x is untainted, because the analyzer cannot assume
anything about func
11 }
Source code 3.2: Taint propagation with functions
If the function is not defined in the same compilation unit, then the taint propagation
will depend on the built-in functions of the checker. Obviously, only common functions
could be defined there. Otherwise, the function is unknown, so the checker should handle
it as propagator of taintedness, if any of its parameters is tainted. Importantly, this is a
potential source of false positives. On the other hand, it would help to find as many true
positives as possible. Above all, the correct solution is to make this behavior configurable.
In summary, the framework offer the following features:
• It works in one compilation unit
• The checker is called on every function call
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• Store the operations which are performed on symbolic values
3.2 Internal architecture
The checker works with function names and classifies them to four groups:
• Sources: mark their return value or output parameter(s) unconditionally tainted
• Propagators: mark their return value or output parameter(s) if at least one of its
input parameters are tainted
• Sanitizers: remove the taint from the specified arguments
• Sinks: emit bug report if the given argument is tainted
1 void foo() {
2 int x;
3 // Reading from user returns tainted value
4 scanf("%d", &x); // x is tainted
5
6 // Unknown function propagate taintedness
7 int z = func(x); // z is tainted
8
9 // Filters remove taintedness
10 myFilter(&x);
11
12 // Sinks emit warning, if it get tainted value
13 mySink(x); // No warning
14 mySink(z); // Warning
15 }
Source code 3.3: The checker’s expected behavior
The checker contains the most common functions in a predefined list to improve its
efficiency. Unfortunately, sanitizer functions cannot be defined, because they always de-
pend on the current environment. Consequently, the configuration of the checker is an
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indispensable feature. Without configuration, the chance of a true positive is inversely
proportional with the project size, as well as the number of the used third-party libraries.








Figure 3.1: State transition system for taint analysis[11]
3.3 Support of C++ language features
C++ is one of the most popular programming languages in the world, therefore it is
very important to support its features. This significantly increases the checkers’ complex-
ity due to the references, namespaces, templates, and objects.
Currently, the checker compares the function’s name with a list of names. Use of
namespaces in the function’s name greatly decrease the number of false positives caused
by name collision. For instance, there is a C library function read, which name is com-
monly used.
1 struct Foo {
2 ssize_t read(int, void*, size_t);
3 };
4
5 namespace bar {
6 ssize_t read(int, void*, size_t);
7 }
8
9 void func() {
10 int fd; // Tainted file descriptor
11 constexpr size_t size = 128;
16




15 foo.read(fd, buffer, size); // No match
16
17 bar::read(fd, buffer, size); // No match
18
19 // Posix read function
20 read(fd, buffer, size); // Match -> buffer will become tainted
21 }
Source code 3.4: Functioning of scopes
The templates and inheritance make this model more complicated. The user has to be
able to configure functions for all instantiations or just specific ones. However, normal
strings and pattern matching does not offer flexibility for it. By contrast, regular expres-
sions are much more appropriate for this use case.
The object-oriented programming paradigm is widely used in C++, therefore, taint
propagation through object should be available. Even if the analyzer knows the struc-
ture of the object, it should bind the taintedness to the whole object instead of its fields.
Usually, the whole implementation is not available for the analyzer. Consequently, the
checker should adapt to the implementation details, which is not a scalable solution. In
conclusion, the optional way is to treat objects like a black box. For objects, the tainted-
ness should originate from assignments, constructors, member functions or free functions.
Assignments always have to propagate taintedness. On the other hand, constructors and
functions should be configurable.
To sum up, there are three essential features for a taint checker:
• Namespaces and member functions for configuration
• Work with templates and inheritance
• Tainted this
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3.4 Support of C++ I/O
In order to model taint propagation properly, the taint sources should be defined very
carefully. C++ greatly increases the possible ways to handle I/O, in particular, streams
and stream buffers.
To begin, the most straightforward way to read data from the user is the std::cin (or
std::wcin). This is a global object of class std::istream which controls input. Under the
hood, it is associated with the C input stream stdin. These objects have to be marked as
tainted from the beginning of the program.
Notably, uses of std::cin adduce the problem of C++’s overloaded operators. The most
common way to read formatted data from the standard input is the extraction operator. It
is fundamental to consider extraction operator in the same way as functions, which means
if the object is tainted, the returned value will become tainted. Moreover, it has to work
with all types of objects.
1 void foo() {
2 int x;
3 std::cin >> x; // x is tainted
4
5 char title[256];
6 std::cin.getline(title, 256); // title is tainted
7 }
Source code 3.5: Read from std::cin
Subsequently, one can gather unformatted input from std::basic_istream objects.
Those functions should be handled as propagators. Furthermore, it does not have to de-
pend on the template parameter and it has to work on its derived classes.
Then, the data can be read from files. C++ provide std::basic_ifstream for it.
Fortunately, it is derived from std::basic_istream, so the reading operations are already
solved. Another key thing to remember, all objects of this type has to be tainted after
construction.
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1 void foo() {
2 int x;
3 std::ifstream file("example.txt");
4 file >> x; // y is tainted
5 std::string str;
6 file >> str; // str is tainted
7 }
Source code 3.6: Read from std::ifstream
Next, std::basic_istringstream is slightly different. It gets a string and considers it
as a stream. As a result, it behaves as a taint propagator instead of a source. Hence, its
constructor and str method should mark the objects as tainted. The propagation is solved
by the inherited functions.
1 void foo() {
2 int x, y;
3 std::string str1;
4 std::cin >> str1;
5 std::string str2{"123 Sample string."};
6 std::istringstream is{str2};
7 iss >> x; // x is not tainted
8 iss.str(str1); // str1 is tainted, so iss become tainted
9 iss >> y; // y is tainted
10 }
Source code 3.7: Use of std::istringstream
Finally, I/O can happen through iterators. The std::istream_iterator’s constructor ex-
pects a std::basic_istream object. If the parameter is tainted, the iterator should become
tainted. Accordingly, its dereference operator produce a tainted value.
1 void foo() {
2 std::istream_iterator<std::string> iit(std::cin);
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3 std::string str = *iit; // str is tainted
4 }
Source code 3.8: Use of std::istream_iterator
All things considered, the checker has to support various C++ I/O features:
• std::cin should be tainted
• Extraction operator should propagate taint
• std::(i)fstream should be tainted
• std::(i)stringstream should propagate taint





In Clang SA there is an existing, built-in checker for taint analysis called
GenericTaintChecker. It is responsible to initiate and propagate taintedness and it also
emits a warning in specific cases. Besides, other checkers use taintedness, for instance,
DivideZero, VLASize, and ArrayBoundV2.




5 int y = 1/x; // Division by a tainted value, possibly zero
6 int buffer[x]; // Declared variable-length array (VLA) has tainted
size
7 int buf[10];
8 buf[x] = 1; // Out of bound memory access (index is tainted)
9 }
Source code 4.1: Suspicious patterns I
The checker is called every time when the analyzer processes a function call. Firstly,
it checks the function against the built-in list of suspicious patterns:
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1 void foo() {
2 char s[80];
3 fscanf(stdin, "%s", s);
4 char buf[128];








13 int *buf1 = (int*)malloc(ts*sizeof(int)); // Untrusted data is used
to specify the buffer size
14 }
Source code 4.2: Suspicious patterns II
Next, the checker tries to propagate taint through the predefined functions. It contains
many taint propagation rules associated with the function’s names. These rules describe
if one of the specified argument is tainted, and in such cases it will mark other arguments
as tainted. Finally, the checker tries to initiate taint. There are a bunch of functions which
always return a tainted value, in particular, scanf and socket.
1 void foo() {
2 char buffer[100];
3 int sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0); // sock is become tainted
4 read(sock, buffer, 100); // Because sock is tainted, buffer will be
tainted
5 }
Source code 4.3: Propagation
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4.2 Revision of the checker
Firstly, I simplified the taint propagation rules and made it more expressive. There
wasn’t a clean way to describe variadic functions, however, a lot of C library I/O functions
are variadic. After that, I could fix propagation rules that were not correct, resulting from
the shortcomings of the implementation. The final representation of taint propagation
rules are the following:
• SrcArgs (source arguments): A list of indexes. If one of the actual parameters are
tainted, the expression is tainted.
• DstArgs (destination arguments): A list of indexes. Those arguments, which will
get the taintedness, if the expression is tainted.
• VarType (variadic type): An enum with three element:
– None: Default value, do nothing.
– Src: The variadic arguments act as taint source. If any of it tainted, the expres-
sion is tainted.
– Dst: The variadic arguments act as taint destination. If the expression is
tainted, the variadic arguments will get taint.
• VarIndex (variadic index): The index of the first variadic argument, if there is any.
I did another simplification on the implementation. The taint initiation used to be a
separated step, in turn, it was possible to do it in the same step as the propagation. As a
result, I consider the source functions as if they propagate from nothing.
My following patches are already merged into the analyzer:
• I revised GenericTaintChecker’s internal representation.[14]
• I fixed taint propagation for source functions.[15]




Any of it tainted? Tainted












Figure 4.1: Taint propagation
4.3 Configuration
The configuration is a totally new feature of the checker, moreover, there was not any
similar in the Clang SA to this either. I chose yaml as the configuration file format because
it is a human-friendly data serialization language. Furthermore, the LLVM has an API for
parsing yaml files. The checker gets the file’s name as a command line parameter.
The file has four optional fields. Firstly, the checker’s aggressiveness can be chosen.
By default, it is not aggressive, because the Clang SA’s policy is to reduce the number of
false positives as much as possible. When it is set to false the taint propagation consider
24
4. Implementation
all unknown function as they do not propagate taintedness. In aggressive mode when the
analyzer hits such a function it will propagate taint to all possible arguments if any of its
argument is tainted.[17]
Secondly, the propagation rules are entries in a dictionary. Each rule is identified by
the function’s name. The scope, source and destination arguments, the variadic type, and
index can be configured. The scope is a regular expression which is matched against the
function’s full name (with namespaces). If the checker runs on non-aggressive mode,
then the propagation rules will increase the chance to find a true positive. Otherwise,
the propagation rules will decrease the number of false positives. There are cases when
the user uses a third party library to manage I/O for the application. At this time the
configuration is indispensable because the analyzer is unable to find any bug without taint
sources.[18]
As a result of the configuration, sanitizer functions could be introduced thus the user
can define functions which remove the taintedness. With this feature, the false positives
can be removed easily it without any tooling. To implement this I had to revise the tainted-
ness representation. It was represented as an unsigned integer. I added an extremal value to
represent the lack of taintedness. Therefore, if the tainted value is not present or it is zero
the value is not tainted, otherwise it is. As a result, sanitizer functions can be considered
as propagators which set values to not tainted.[19]
Finally, a custom sink can be configured. In security critical application sometimes
there are functions which expect sanitized data. For instance, it can be a third party li-
brary where the implementation is unknown, therefore, the checker will not recognize the
potential security issue. It can greatly complement the built-in patterns.[18]
1 A g g r e s s i v e : f a l s e
2
3 Propagat ions :
4 - Name: mySource
5 DstArgs : [−1 , 0 ] # Index for return value
6 - Name: myPropaga to r
7 SrcArgs : [ 0 ]
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8 DstArgs : [ 1 ]
9 - Name: myScanf




14 F i l t e r s :
15 - Name: m y F i l t e r
16 Scope : "Foo::"
17 Args: [ 0 ]
18
19 Sinks :
20 - Name: mySink
21 Scope : "myNamespace::Bar::"
22 Args: [ 0 , 2 ]
Source code 4.4: Example configuration
There are some other technical details for the configuration:
• The return value is represented by -1
• The arguments are numbered from 0
• Filters and sinks accept multiple arguments
As a result, users can considerably can reduce the number of false positive and in-
crease the number of true positives. The yaml format offers a clear, human-readable con-
figuration file without being too verbose. In order to model taint propagation properly, the
taint sources should be defined very carefully. C++ greatly increases the possible ways
to handle I/O, in particular, streams and stream buffers, therefore, it is important for the
configuration to support the namespaces.
1 void foo() {
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2 int x, y;
3 x = mySource(&y); // x and y is tainted
4
5 int z = myPropagator(x); // z is tainted
6
7 myFilter(y); // y is no longer tainted
8
9 mySource(y, 1, 2); // No warning
10 mySource(z, 1, 2); // Warning
11 }
Source code 4.5: The impact of configuration
I did the following patches related to the configuration:
• I added a yaml parser to GenericTaintChecker.[17]
• I implemented the uses of custom source, propagation and sink functions.[18]
• I implemented the filtering functions.[19]
4.4 C++ support
4.4.1 Language features
The original taint checker was mostly built on C. In this particular case, this means
taint can propagate through arithmetic operations and functions where the parameters are
pointers. Moreover, the structs do not contain any method. Therefore, the analyzer can
trace the taint’s path easily. By contrast, in C++ the classes usually have private members
and the fields can be manipulated through member functions. Consequently, the imple-
mentation is not always known.
Firstly, I added support for references. The users prefer them over pointers, because
they cannot be null, so their support is essential. Without it, the configuration will not
work properly, because parameter pass by reference was simply ignored.
Then, I completed the configuration with a new field called Scope. The Scope is a
prefix for the function’s full name, for instance myNamespace::myClass::. It helps to
27
4. Implementation
refine the checker’s accuracy. The configuration is stored in a map. The function’s name is
the key, the scope and the other data are the value. First, it gets the value via the function’s
name for each map. If it is not present, it continues to another check. Second, if the scope
is present, it will be compared with the start of the function’s full name. Above all, a
function is a match with a configuration entry, if the name is equal and the scope is not
present or matched.
Is Name match?









Figure 4.2: Function name matching
Next, the member functions have to be evaluated properly. The analyzer uses a differ-
ent way for the implicit this and the other parameters. I had to create a new abstraction
layer to handle them in the same way. The implicit parameter is the zeroth and the explicit
parameters start at one if it is a member function.
The Clang SA handle the assignment in a different way for primitive and complex
types. For objects, the assignment is a call for the overloaded operator. Therefore, I had
to add an entry for overloaded operators and create a taint propagation rule for the assign-
ment operator. This rule propagates taint to the first argument and the return value if the
second argument is tainted.
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The most common way to read from any stream is with the extraction operator. It is
an overloaded operator such as the assignment operator, so it requires a custom propaga-
tion rule too. It propagates taint to the second argument and the return value if the first
argument is tainted.
1 struct Foo {
2 int getInt() const; // Configured to propagate taint
3 };




8 namespace myNamespace {
9 void mySink(int&); // Configured to sink
10 }
11
12 void bar() {
13 Foo foo;
14 std::cin >> foo; // foo is tainted
15
16 int x = foo.getInt(); // x is tainted
17 mySink(x); // No warning
18 myNamespace::mySink(x); // Warning
19 }
Source code 4.6: Supported C++ language features
4.4.2 Strings
There are several vulnerabilities due to the use of unsanitized strings, for instance,
SQL injection, and XSS. What is more, they can be converted to integral types which can
lead to other security issues. The std::basic_string class is a template and it has many
instantiations. My goal is to support all of them. Strings (and other objects) can get taint
with assignment or extraction operator.
29
4. Implementation
The standard string’s representation is not known, so it behaves like a black box. I hard
coded the commonly used string operations: c_str, data, size, length and the non-member
getline. These functions are enough for common use-cases.
1 void mySink(const char*);
2
3 void foo() {
4 std::string str1, str2;
5 std::cin >> str1; // str1 is tainted
6 std::getline(std::cin, str2); // str2 is tainted
7
8 mySink(str1.c_str()); // Warning
9 int buffer[10];
10 buffer[str2.size()] = 1; // Warning
11 }
Source code 4.7: Strings
4.4.3 Streams
When one would like to read data in C++, usually a stream will be used. If a stream
reads data from an external source, the data will be tainted. There is one exception, the
stringstream, where the taintedness should depend on the actual parameters.
Firstly, I had to mark std::cin (and std::wcin) as tainted. When the analyzer checks if
an actual parameter is tainted, it returns true if the object’s name is cin (or wcin). It also
must be in the standard namespace. The C stdin is recognized in the same way.
Next, the data can be read from files. Unfortunately, I got a problem when I was trying
to mark ifstream objects as tainted. The open function is implemented in the header file, so
I cannot model it. I chose a simple but efficient way to solve it. The checker considers all
of the descendants of std::basic_istream as tainted. Therefore, the std::cin doesn’t have to
be handled separately. It works fine for files too, because a file stream cannot be sanitized
only the content read from it.
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Although it works properly most of the cases, but it has its own limitations. When
a stringstream is used for I/O the output’s taintedness depends on the input string.
Accordingly, this solution can cause potential false positives.
1 void myFilter(std::istream&); // Sanitizer functions
2
3 void foo() {
4 std::string str1, str2, str3, str4;
5 std::cin >> str1; // str1 is tainted
6 myFilter(std::cin); // std::istream object cannot be sanitized
7
8 std::ifstream file("example.txt");
9 file >> str2; // str2 is tainted
10 myFilter(file); // std::istream object cannot be sanitized
11 file >> str3; // str3 is tainted
12
13 std::string sample{"123 Sample string."};
14 std::istringstream is{sample};
15 is >> str4; // str4 is tainted (False positive)
16 }





5.1.1 Commit to Clang Static Analyzer
As I started the work on an existing implementation it is obvious that I should commit
my changes to the analyzer. Since the review, the review is a time-consuming process I
have not committed all of my changes yet. The revision of the checker’s internal imple-
mentation is part of the analyzer because that was a non-functional change. I have three
open revisions about the configuration and many other changes in my local trunk.
5.1.2 Make the checker default
The GenericTaintChecker (which accomplishes taint analysis) is currently an exper-
imental checker in the Clang SA, which means it is merely compiled but disabled by
default. Our goal is to produce a reliable checker with a low false positive rate. To achieve
this, I have to finalize its internal architecture, because it is much more difficult to commit
changes into default checkers.
The checker offers a framework for taint analysis and the results are used to emit warn-
ings. The framework is currently used by three other checkers: DivideZero, VLASize,
ArrayBoundV2. The last one in an experimental checker, therefore, it is worth revising to
move it to the default checkers. Moreover, new checkers should be implemented which
rely on taint analysis.
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5.1.3 C++ related features
The constructors are not supported yet, because the analyzer considers them differ-
ently than functions. They are essential for the taint propagation between objects. The
assignment operator propagates taint, although it does not cover all the cases. Secondly,
unknown objects can be modeled as taint propagators. If the constructor gets a tainted
value, it should mark the whole object as tainted.
1 void foo() {
2 std::string str1, str2;
3 std::cin >> str1; // str1 is tainted
4 str2 = str1; // str2 is tainted
5 std::string str3 = str1; // str3 is not tainted, because it is a copy
constructor call
6
7 const char* cstr = str3.c_str(); // cstr is tainted;
8 std::string str4(cstr); // str4 is not tainted
9 }
Source code 5.1: Constructors
The std::istream objects are always implemented as tainted, which is not always true.
My plan was to find as many defects as possible and then refine the model. Unfortunately,
the C++ language features’ coverage was not enough to find any defect, or I chose inade-
quate projects. Accordingly, it should be fine-tuned.
It is possible to read data through std::istream_iterator, but for the most common
use case of the constructor’s taint propagation should be supported. Besides that, all con-
tainers’ begin, end (and their variant) have to propagate taint, as well as std::begin, and
std::end. Not to mention, the overloaded dereference and arrow operator have to propa-
gate taint.
The configuration can be complemented with function attributes. Then the checker
will be configured without a configuration file. Although it has its own drawback it can
work together with the yaml configuration very well.
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5.1.4 Other miscellaneous features
The most straightforward source of a tainted value is the main function’s parameters.
The number of command line parameters are not limited, and their content is unknown.
Therefore, they should be marked as taint, if they are presented.
During the tests, I ran my checker under the CodeChecker to analyze the projects with
my checker. It has a bug track visitor, which can find the defect’s origin. It works fine
for the taint checking until the taint is propagated through anything other than a function.
Unfortunately, the analyzer loses the path, if the taint originates from a function with an
unknown definition. It does not increase the analyzer’s performance, however, it greatly
increases the user experience especially in big projects.
1 void foo() {
2 int x, y;
3 std::cin >> x; // real origin of the taint
4
5 propagator(x, y); // analyzer thinks the taint originated from here
6 mySink(y); // y is tainted, warning
7 }
Source code 5.2: Bug track visitor
5.2 Conclusion
In this thesis, I optimized the model of the taint analysis for C/C++ programs, and
implemented it in Clang Static Analyzer. Taint analysis is essential for security-critical
applications because it can find vulnerabilities without executing the code.
After I tested the implementation against several projects and evaluated the defects, I
made some conclusions. The original checker’s notion was false since it made taint prop-
agation with only compile-time known functions. In theory, it will cause very few false
positives, but it works in just few cases, which are rare in large code bases. My greatest
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result is aggressive propagation, where unknown functions always propagate taint. This
was indispensable to find the defects in curl, which prove this concept’s viability.
The configuration is useful to define taint sources and to reduce the number of false
positives. It can improve the quality of the analysis, however, it requires extra time from
the developers.
The C++ support needs further investigation to achieve high enough coverage. Despite





C sources No Yes
C++ sources No Yes
Propagation with operators Yes
Propagation with functions No Yes
Sinks No Yes
Configure sources Yes No Yes
Configure propagators No Yes
Configure sanitizers No Yes
Configure sinks Yes No Yes
Namespaces Yes No Yes
Member functions No Yes
Table 5.1: The comparison of analyzers’ taint analysis
Finally, I compare the Facebook Infer, the CustomTaintChecker (the plugin, which
was forked from Clang SA), the previous Clang SA, and my own version. My imple-
mentation contains every relevant feature of the others, moreover, it has C++ support and
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